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Abstract
We collect data from three Italian microcredit institutions, MAG2,
MAG4 and MAG6, which operate in Milan, Turin and Reggio Emilia re-
spectively, by targeting two categories of wealthless borrowers: single en-
trepreneurs and organizations (cooperatives and associations). Evidence
shows that organizations repay with higher probability and are charged
a lower average interest rate than individuals. We use these ﬁndings to
construct a lending scheme which consists of granting loans provided that
borrowers form production teams (i.e. organizations). We consider a mi-
crocredit market with adverse selection à la De Meza-Webb and we verify
that both repayment rate and welfare increase, while interest rate falls
with respect to individual lending if the above scheme, which we refer to
as production team lending, is implemented. Our instrument, like joint
liability implemented in rural economies, is able to extract information
from borrowers through a peer selection mechanism but, diﬀerently from
joint liability, ﬁts to urban contexts where borrowers do not know each
other and social sanctions are weak.
JEL codes: D82, L31, O12, O16.
Keywords: microcredit, urban areas, production team lending.
∗We are grateful to Emanuele Bacchiega and Tridib Sharma for valuable suggestions. We
also thank seminar audience at Università di Milano-Bicocca for useful comments, Cinzia
Melograno, Cinzia Armari, and, especially, Barbara Aiolﬁ for the time spent helping us to
collect the data.
†Dipartimento di Statistica, Università di Milano-Bicocca, Via Bicocca degli Arcimboldi
8, 20126 Milano, Italy; e-mail: alessandro.fedele@unimib.it.
‡Institutet för tillväxtpolitiska studier (ITPS), Studentplan 3, SE- 831 40 Östersund, Swe-
den; e-mail: federica.calidonilundberg@itps.se.
11 Introduction
Microcredit programmes provide both ﬁnancial services and non-ﬁnancial sup-
port to small-scale entrepreneurs who otherwise lack access to capital markets
because not endowed with assets to be pledged as collateral.
Empirical evidence shows that these unconventional lenders have a reason-
able degree of ﬁnancial self-suﬃciency even if they target poor people whom no
ordinary commercial bank would want as customers. One of the reasons for this
success is the application of joint liability: when informational asymmetry be-
tween lenders and borrowers is more severe than among borrowers themselves,
this scheme of lending is able to mitigate adverse selection problems, inter alia,
without requesting any pecuniary collateral (for exhaustive surveys see, e.g.,
Ghatak and Guinnane [6]; and Fedele [5]). Joint liability works as follows: bor-
rowers, who diﬀer in their ability of repayment and work on distinct projects,
self-select into groups to get the loan. If the group does not fully repay its
obligations, then the microlender cut oﬀ all members from future credit until
the debt is repaid, so that the successful borrowers are induced to help failing
partners. If borrowers have perfect information about each other’s type, then
joint liability drives the good ones to choose partners of the same type, while
the bad ones will have no choice but to form groups with others of the same
type: this is called peer selection and enables the microlender to screen out bor-
rowers; as a result, repayment rates and welfare rise with respect to individual
lending when no ex-ante collateral is put up.
This model of lending turns out to be eﬀective in serving clients who be-
long to rural communities, where networks of local information are strong and
peer pressure from fellow villagers, like reputation loss of insolvent borrowers or
restriction on access to inputs necessary for the business, induces discipline in
repayment. Yet, many experiences show that in urban industrialized areas joint
liability scheme may be a poor ﬁt for potential clients. NEF [11] and Viganò et
2al. [12], henceforth NEF and Viganò, ﬁnd that of the existing microcredit ex-
periences in Western Europe, 79% makes only individual loans, just 4% adopts
group lending with joint liability and 17% makes both individual and group
loans. This is motivated by the fact that people who live in cities are less likely
to know each other, so that peer selection mechanism may not occur: Laﬀont
and N’Guessan [10] show that repayment rates do not increase with joint li-
ability if borrowers ignore the ability of repayment of partners. Furthermore,
social sanctions are less important so that pressure to repay is weaker and joint
liability schemes become inappropriate (Ghatak and Guinnane [6]; Ciravegna
[3]). If microcredit in the poor world ﬁnds its reason to exist in the need to
alleviate poverty, the most important rationales for the spread of microcredit
in the developed world, where tax, legal, welfare, employment and banking
systems are diﬀerent, are to create employment, integrate minority groups and
increase female participation in the workforce; microlending becomes thus a
tool to increase social inclusion, in contrast with the original view of the under-
developed countries where the main force leading to the successful repayment
of microloans is the strong social network (Anderloni [2]; ILO [8]).
Interestingly, the institutions surveyed by NEF and Viganò declare a high
average repayment rate of 90.3%, even if the majority of them charge neither
joint liability nor collateral. Yet, the two reports do not mention whether
alternative lending schemes help to maintain such positive results.1
With the aim of developing a deeper understanding of contractual mecha-
nisms responsible for the good microcredit performance in urban areas, we study
1Armendáriz and Morduch [1] list a number of innovations in the microlending practice
that go beyond joint liability and help to maintain high repayment rates also in places with
scarce local information: among such innovations, progressive lending, which is adopted by
around 50% of the institutions surveyed by NEF and Viganò, consists of granting an initial
small amount of money, whose size increases successively only if the borrower demonstrates
reliability. The scheme enables microlenders to screen out the worst clients before taking
additional risk by expanding loan scale, but presents at least a disadvantage: when there is
a multiplicity of microlenders, borrowers who default on a loan can turn to another ﬁnancial
provider if there is poor information on credit histories, so that threats to not be reﬁnanced
lose vigor.
3the case of 3 microlenders which operate in northern Italian cities: MAG2 Mi-
lano, MAG4 Torino and MAG6 Reggio Emilia. They target two main categories
of borrowers, single entrepreneurs and organizations (cooperatives and associ-
ations), and make individual loans without requesting collateral. We collect
data on interest and repayment rates and we ﬁnd that (i) single entrepreneurs
are charged a higher interest rate and repay less often than organizations, (ii)
among organizations, cooperatives ensure the highest repayment rate and pay
the lowest interest rate. According to these ﬁndings, targeting cooperatives,
rather than associations or individual ﬁrms, turns out to be a good lending
strategy, at least within the MAGs scenario. Our theoretical goal is then to
understand what makes the former better clients than the latter.
The Italian Civil Code helps to meet a possible explanation. It deﬁnes
cooperatives any organization of people that operates for a common purpose,
where each member has to answer for social obligation in case of compulsory
severance or bankruptcy. In the speciﬁc case of loans received by the MAG, no
pecuniary collateral is required. However, once the activity of the cooperative
starts, new actors who require ﬁnancial guarantees come into the picture, such
as suppliers and customers. Associations, on the other hand, are organizations
of people whose rights and duties are stated in the certiﬁcate of incorporation
and articles of association. They identify, among other things, business name,
aim, intent and role of the association, assets and resources, the way they
will be administrated etc.: less emphasis is put on ﬁnancial obligations. It
is clear, therefore, that the ﬁrst type of organization brings more pressure on
the members in order that they produce a good performance, whereas single
contributions within the association are less important for the success of the
project.
The above observations are taken into account to develop the following the-
oretical model. A microcredit market is considered with adverse selection à la
4De Meza and Webb [4] and Laﬀont and N’Guessan [10]. Two types of bor-
rowers are present which diﬀer in their ability of repaying. When lending is
exclusively to individuals, bad borrowers, whose projects are assumed to be so-
cially unproﬁtable, receive funding by the unique microlender because they are
cross-subsidized by projects of the good borrowers. We show that discrimina-
tion among borrowers can be improved if the microlender grants loans provided
that the borrowers form teams of production. More exactly, our lending scheme,
which we refer to as production team lending, consists of two contracts. The
ﬁrst one contains a certain repayment and requires that the team chooses an
“O-ring” technology (Kremer [9]), so that if at least one partner does not per-
form well the whole project fails. This function represents production processes
based on a series of tasks, mistakes in any of which can strongly reduce the out-
put value and the probability of repayment. According to the above discussion,
we argue that such processes are more likely to be implemented in cooperatives
than in associations. The second contract prescribes a higher repayment and
the adoption of a “standard” technology, for which the value of team project is
equal to zero only if all members fail. This function properly represents activ-
ities where smaller degrees of complementarity and coordination are requested
among tasks.
A well-known property of the O-ring production function when members
know each other is peer selection: if teams adopt it, they arise with either all
good or bad borrowers. On the contrary, returns depend on the borrower type
and not on the team composition, when the standard technology is adopted.
As a consequence, good borrowers, who are assumed to succeed with certainty,
are indiﬀerent between the two technologies and select the ﬁrst contract. Bad
borrowers, who fail more often if they employ the O-ring technology, prefer the
second contract even if the repayment is higher. This enables the microlender
to deny credit to their socially unproﬁtable projects. Since only good borrow-
5ers apply for the loan, both repayment rate and welfare increase, while the
equilibrium repayment decreases with respect to individual lending.
The empirical ﬁnding that cooperatives (i.e. teams which employ the O-ring
technology in our interpretation) repay more often than both associations and
single entrepreneurs ﬁnds a theoretical justiﬁcation: at equilibrium cooperatives
are exclusively formed by good borrowers when production team lending is
implemented.
We argue that entrepreneurs participating in a common project and focused
on its success are likely to reproduce a cohesion typical of joint liability schemes,
but based on ﬁnancial, and not social, sanctions: this can be a useful alterna-
tive to joint liability in the urban social context. Moreover, the problem of
competition among microlenders is not related to our scheme, since it does not
entail threats of future denied access to credit (see Note 1).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
further details of the NEF and Viganò surveys. In Section 3 we carry out the
empirical analysis of MAGs. The individual lending theoretical model is laid
out in Section 4. Section 5 introduces production team lending and Section 6
concludes.
2 Microcredit in Western Europe
The development of microcredit in Europe has been quite widespread in the
last decades but it has also shown very diﬀerent features from the original idea
of Yunus, based on joint liability.
The literature concerning European industrialised countries is still limited
with two relevant surveys as cornerstones of the existing work, the aforemen-
tioned NEF and Viganò, which help to develop a deeper understanding of the
current state of microcredit in Europe: 30 organisations were contacted by NEF
and 32 by Viganò, with an overlapping of 11 institution that leads to a total
6of 51 interviews. Only 44% of the institutions provide non-ﬁnancial support
services and 59% do not ask any kind of collateral for the loan. Microcredit
experiences can be found in many countries in Western Europe (Ireland, Spain,
Portugal, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Sweden
and Norway) and, given the contrasting legal and regulatory environment, they
seem to assume diﬀerent institutional forms. The most common are Coopera-
tives (31%) and Foundations (25%), followed by non-bank ﬁnancial institutions
(19%), NGOs (9%), associations (9%) and banks (7%). As mentioned above,
79% of the surveyed organisations only make individual loans, 4% only group
loans and 17% make both individual and group loans; the greatest coverage
and outreach is taking place in France with 52.7% of the loans made by all the
microlenders, followed by Finland with 27.3%; 90% of the microcredit institu-
tions give loans for start-up of entrepreneurial activities. Some other relevant
statistical ﬁndings by NEF and Viganò concern the ﬁnancial characteristics of
the loans: the average loan size around Europe is 12500C =, with average loans
terms of 33 months and interest rates that range from a minimum of 0% to a
maximum of 19.5%, with an average of 6.8%. In addition repayment rate range
from a minimum of 50% to a maximum of 100%, with average repayment rate
of 90.3%.
In conclusion, as NEF states, “the microcredit industry in Western Europe
is young and growing and the diﬀerent entrepreneurial environments, legal and
banking systems that exist across Europe mean that one microcredit model
cannot be replicated in another country with the same results”.
3 The Italian MAGs: Empirical Analysis
While reviewing the existing literature on microcredit we became immediately
aware of the lack of a unique and clear deﬁnition of microcredit, especially in
industrialised countries where many institutions tend to call themselves mi-
7crolenders every time they lend sums below C = 25000, requiring both pecuniary
and personal collateral. Therefore our ﬁrst step was to choose an unambigu-
ous deﬁnition of microcredit institution as an organization that lends money
to “active poor” for start-up of business activity without asking any ﬁnancial
collateral and provides support services to allow the borrower to make the loan
fruitful.2
In Italy the institution that better ﬁts our requirements is MAG (Mutua
Autogestita), a national entity divided in six regional groups; of this only three
provide loans to business activities: MAG2 Milano, MAG4 Torino and MAG6
Reggio Emilia. The ﬁrst MAG was created in 1978 in Verona in order to satisfy
the increasing need of new ﬁnancial tools to support projects with a social impli-
cations that would not otherwise get funds in the traditional ﬁnancial markets.
MAGs are Cooperatives or, as they prefer to deﬁne themselves, self-sustainable
societies of people that save and use private capital to ﬁnance fruitful projects.
They are therefore authorised by the members to lend money to other mem-
bers with favorable interest rates and repayment conditions, providing support
services and without requiring any ﬁnancial collateral.
The empirical analysis of the data available from the three MAGs is based on
337 loans for start-up of business activities. We study the diﬀerence between
loans to individuals and to organizations both in terms of interest rates and
repayment rates. By September 2005 the three MAGs have provided 277 loans
to organizations and 60 to individuals. This recalls MAG’s original objective
of ﬁnancing organizations with strong participation of workers and investors in
the business activity.
We ﬁrst compute the average values of the interest rate for (i) individuals
and organizations, (ii) within the latter, for cooperatives, from the one hand,
2Gonzalez-Vega [7] deﬁnes active poor as those people that, even if living in poverty, prove
to be technically skilled and entrepreneurial to such a degree as to enable them to develop, and
autonomously run, an economic activity, or to at least produce a constant ﬂow of resources
which can be used for repayment of debt or for savings.
8and associations, from the other hand. We then deﬁne repayment rate r as
follows:
r =
Amount repaid at time t
Amount due at time t
and compute its average values. Tables 1 and 2 below show the outcome of our
analysis on MAGs’ data.
8,78% 87,36% 277 Loans to Organizations
9,33% 76,47% 60 Loans to Single Entrepreneurs
Interest Rate Repayment Rate Number
Table 1. Data analysis MAGS September 2005 (averages): single vs.
organizations
9,23% 85,79% 112 Loans to Associations
8,48% 88,42% 165 Loans to Cooperatives
Interest Rate Repayment Rate Number
Table 2. Data analysis MAGS September 2005 (averages): among the 277
organizations, cooperatives vs. associations
This result suggests that lending to organizations is less risky and enables
the microlender to charge a lower interest rate according to the purpose of pro-
moting employment and social inclusion through favorable ﬁnancial conditions.
Disaggregating the data on organizations, we ﬁnd that cooperatives are better
clients than associations. In the two following sections we develop a contrac-
tual scheme on the basis of these ﬁndings. As anticipated before, we argue that
granting loans provided that borrowers form cooperatives implements a mech-
9anism for which partners are chosen with the same ability of repaying. This
helps the microlender to overcome a typical informational problem of the credit
market: adverse selection.
4 Individual Lending
Consider a microcredit market with two types of wealthless risk-neutral bor-
rowers. Borrowers of type L propose projects which yield A with probability
pL = p < 1 and zero otherwise. Projects of type H borrowers yield A with
probability pH = 1. Throughout the paper we refer to type L(H) borrowers as
bad (good). Each borrower needs one unit of capital to implement the project
and applies for a loan.
Money is provided by a risk-neutral microlending institution which knows
the fraction λ of bad borrowers and the fraction 1 − λ of good borrowers in
the population, but ignores which speciﬁc borrower is of which type. The
opportunity cost of labor is equal to ¯ u, while ρ is the opportunity unit cost
of capital. The two values represent the reservation utility of borrowers and
microlender, respectively.
Assumption 1 ¯ u
p +
ρ
pM ≤ A <
¯ u+ρ
p ,
where pM = 1 − λ(1 − p) is the average expected probability of repayment.
Assumption 1 implies that only projects implemented by the good borrowers
are socially proﬁtable.
The microlending institution proposes a ﬁnancial contract in which the
following limited liability constraint is speciﬁed for the borrowers: when the
project succeeds they have to repay an amount Ri, where i = L,H, that can-
not exceed the realized returns, whereas if returns are zero nothing is repaid.
Without loss of generality we can pose the optimal contracting problem as fol-
lows. The microlending institution chooses Ri such that its unitary expected
10proﬁts are minimum for it is a not-for-proﬁt organization, provided that its
participation constraint and limited liability plus incentive compatibility con-
straints of the borrowers are satisﬁed:
min
R
λpRL + (1 − λ)RH (1)
s.t.
λpRL + (1 − λ)RH ≥ ρ,
Ri ≤ A,
p(A − RL) ≥ p(A − RH), (ICL)
A − RH ≥ A − RL, (ICH)
















Assumption 1 implies that pM is high enough, i.e., the fraction λ of the bad
borrowers is low enough, to induce them to participate and make a negative
contribution to welfare, deﬁned as the sum of expected values of the projects:
this represents the adverse selection eﬀect. We sum up these ﬁndings in the
following
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, both good and bad borrowers apply for
the loan if individual lending is implemented: repayment rate is pM and unitary
welfare is λpA + (1 − λ)A.
Socially unproﬁtable projects of bad borrowers do receive funding because
good borrowers produce an eﬀect of cross-subsidization: the economy is char-
acterized by overinvestment.
115 Production Team Lending
This section shows how forming productive teams among wealthless borrowers
can raise both repayment rate and welfare with respect to individual lending
without charging any collateral.
The microlending institution grants loans to borrowers provided that they
choose partners to form teams of production. Each team must count n ≥ 2
borrowers. They have perfect information about each other: we think of people
who self-select to start up a business together. The microlender oﬀers a pair of
contracts. The ﬁrst contract {OT,nROT} requires the adoption of an O-ring
technology (OT), where project of the team fails if at least one member fails,
and a repayment nROT, which is due by the team as a whole only in the case
of success. The second contract {ST,RST} prescribes the use of a standard
technology (ST), where returns of the team are equal to the sum of returns
of each member, and a repayment RST which is owed by the team for any
success of the members. This scheme is referred to as production team lending
(henceforth PTL).
In symbols, when the team consists of nL bad borrowers plus nH good
borrowers, where nL + nH = n, output is represented by
pnL1nHnA = pnLnA, (4)
if the team chooses OT, and by
nLpA + nHA = (pnL + nH)A, (5)
if ST is selected. Before proceeding, we assume that each borrower is entitled
to an amount 1/n of team output and we describe the timing of the PTL model
by specifying that the microlender observes the technology before the contract
is signed.3
3Alternatively, the microlender may observe the technology after the contract is signed but
before R is repaid: see Note 8.
121. At t = 0, the microlender proposes the above pair of ﬁnancial contracts.
Then, the borrowers form teams, choose a contract and apply for the loan.
2. At t = 1, the borrowers, who have no time preference, obtain funds and
invest.
3. At t = 2, returns of project accrue and the borrowers repay in the case of
success.
5.1 Peer Selection with O-Ring Technology
In this subsection we verify that borrowers choose partners of the same type
when OT is selected: this is called peer selection.
If the contract {OT,nROT} is accepted, expected proﬁt of a team which
counts nL partners of type L and nH of type H is given by
pnLn(A − ROT). (6)
This value is maximum when nL is minimum, i.e., nL = 0 and nH = n: this
means that type H are preferred for they increase the probability of success. It
follows that type H borrowers will form teams among them, while bad borrowers
will try to attract preferred type H.
We assume that population of both bad and good borrowers is a multiple
of n. We check whether an equilibrium where teams consist by either all good
or bad borrowers is robust to bilateral deviations, where (i) a type L will try
to take the place of a type H by making transfers to her, which must at least
equalize loss of the good borrower from joining a team with all bad mates, (ii)
the other borrowers (i.e. n−1 type H and n−1 type L ones who do not change
team) are not allowed to make transfers among them.4
If a type L takes the place of a type H in an all good borrowers’ team, her
gain is given by the diﬀerence between bad borrower’s expected proﬁt when she
4Such transfers are not monetary because borrowers are wealthless. They rather consist,
for example, of providing free labor services.
13teams up with all good mates, i.e.
1
n
pn(A − ROT), (7)
and the corresponding value when mates are all bad, i.e.
1
n









is the increased probability of success. Similarly, we can




(A − ROT), (10)
where 1−pn−1 is the decreased probability of success. Given that (9) < (10), a
type L borrower cannot compensate a good one with a side transfer to take her
place in an all good borrowers’ team and simultaneously end up with a positive
return. This condition is suﬃcient to conclude that teams arise with either all
good or bad borrowers.5 The former ends up with A−ROT, whereas the latter
gets pn (A − ROT). The intuition is as follows: good borrowers value good
mates more than bad borrowers because they succeed with higher probability,
thereby being more likely to realize gains of having a good mate.
5Peer selection arises even when borrowers who do not swicht team are able to make







+ (n − 1)(1 − p)p
n−1￿








where the LHS is gain of the type L who joins an all good borrowers’ team plus gain of n−1
type L who do not change team and the RHS is the corresponding loss of the type H who
switchs team plus loss of n − 1 type H who do not. It is easy to check that inequality (11)
still holds.
145.2 Selection with Standard Technology
When the contract {ST,RST} is selected, team formation displays diﬀerent
characteristics. Indeed, expected proﬁt of a team which counts nL partners of
type L and nH of type H is given by
(pnL + nH)(A − RST). (12)
Again, this value is maximum when nL = 0 and nH = n: type H will create
teams among them. By following the above reasoning, we compute gain of a
bad borrower from leaving a team with all peers and joining a team with all
good ones and loss of a good borrower from following the opposite path. The
latter value is obtained by the diﬀerence between good borrower’s expected
proﬁt when the team counts all good mates,
1
n
n(A − RST), (13)
and the corresponding value when mates are all bad
1
n





(A − RST). (15)
Similarly, gain of a bad borrower from joining all good partners is
1
n
[(p + n − 1) − np](A − RST) = (n − 1)
(1 − p)
n
(A − RST). (16)
Note that (15) is equal to (16): in this case a type L borrower can com-
pensate a good one with a side transfer to take her place in the team with all
type H mates and simultaneously end up with a nonnegative return.6 With ST
repayment may be due by bad borrowers even if they fail, hence they are con-
cerned with the type of mates also in such a case. It turns out that borrowers
6As in Note 5, it is easy to show that this result extends to the case where also borrowers
who do not swicht team are able to make transfers among them.
15are indiﬀerent between matching with good or bad mates, provided that (15) is
transferred from the latter to the former. In such a case, good borrowers end up
with A−RST and bad ones with p(A − RST) for any sort of team composition.7
5.3 Optimal Separating Contract with Production Team Lend-
ing
In this subsection we show how the microlender is able to screen between good
and bad borrowers if the above pair of contracts is accepted.
The microlender anticipates that expected proﬁt of good borrowers is (A − ROT)
if they accept {OT,nROT} and (A − RST) if they accept {ST,RST}. If the fol-
lowing condition holds
A − ROT ≥ A − RST, (17)
the microlender knows that all good borrowers will select the contract {OT,nROT},
thereby matching among them, and that bad borrowers will have no choice but
to form teams with other bad borrowers. It follows that bad borrowers will
accept contract {ST,RST} when8
p(A − RST) ≥ pn (A − ROT), (18)
where the two sides of the above inequality represent expected proﬁts of bad
borrowers if they accept either {ST,RST} or {OT,nROT}, respectively. The
two incentive compatibility constraints are summed up as follows:
ROT ≤ RST ≤
￿
1 − pn−1￿
A + pn−1ROT. (19)
With no loss of generality, the optimal contracting problem can be deﬁned
as follows: the microlender sets RST to minimize his own proﬁts on contract
{ST,RST}, subject to his participation constraint, to zero-proﬁt condition on
7See the Appendix for remarks when more general types of technology are considered.
8If the technology is observed after the contract is signed, then the IC constraint (18)
can be rewritten as p(A − RST) ≥ p(A − ROT − F), where F is a ﬁne charged to the bad
borrowers when they adopt the standard technolgy after choosing the lower repayment.






































A + pn−1ρ. (22)
If (1 − pn)ρ ≤ (p − pn)A, solution to (21) is R∗
ST =
ρ
p. Remark that zero-proﬁt
condition on contract {OT,nROT} gives R∗
OT = ρ. Good borrowers end up






. The latter value is lower than the
reservation utility u under Assumption 1, hence only good teams will apply.
This neutralizes the above adverse selection eﬀect: the repayment rate rises to
1 and unitary welfare to λ(¯ u + ρ) + (1 − λ)A. Note that R∗
OT is lower than
R
◦
, the equilibrium repayment when lending is individual. We summarize these
ﬁndings in the following
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1 and if (1 − pn)ρ ≤ (p − pn)A, PTL low-
ers the equilibrium repayment and raises both repayment rate and welfare with
respect to individual lending for bad borrowers do not apply for the loan.
17When PTL is implemented, the borrowers self-select among peers if OT is
adopted. This enables the microlender to screen between good and bad clients.
Indeed, good borrowers choose the contract with lower repayment for they are
indiﬀerent between the two technologies. Instead, bad borrowers prefer the
standard technology even if the associated repayment is higher, because they
fail often with OT. It turns out that at equilibrium socially unproﬁtable projects
of bad borrowers do not receive funding and the repayment decreases for the
pool of borrowers is better (i.e. they repay more often than when lending is
individual).
6 Conclusion
Poor local information networks and weak social sanctions in urban developed
areas make joint liability unable to guarantee high repayment rates to microlen-
ders. This paper proposes an alternative microcredit instrument that, like joint
liability, is able to mitigate informational problems in microcredit markets, but
ﬁts to the urban context.
We start by collecting data from MAG2 Milano, MAG4 Torino and MAG6
Reggio Emilia and we ﬁnd that best clients in terms of repayment rate are repre-
sented by cooperatives, while associations and individual entrepreneurs display
less reliability. On this basis, we develop a scheme where loans are granted
provided that wealthless borrowers form production teams and choose between
two production technologies. We show that starting from an overinvestment
situation due to adverse selection when lending is individual, according loans
to teams implements a peer selection mechanism that allows the microlender to
screen between borrowers of diﬀerent quality: at equilibrium only teams which
adopt the O-ring technology (i.e. cooperatives in our interpretation) receive
money for they are formed by all good borrowers. As a consequence, the equi-
librium repayment decreases, while both repayment rate and welfare increase
18with respect to individual lending.
While the joint liability practice emphasizes “social” liaisons among bor-
rowers of the same group, PTL attracts persons who desire to work at the same
project: their links have mainly technological and ﬁnancial nature, especially
when OT is implemented. We believe that this aspect may overcome problems
of poor informational networks and weak social ties, thereby making such an
instrument more suitable to the needs of lenders and borrowers who populate
urban areas. Indeed, if expected proﬁts of each borrower strongly depend on
the performance of potential partners, incentives to get information about the
type of mates and to repay are strong.
From a positive view point, PTL justiﬁes on the basis of a screening mecha-
nism our empirical ﬁnding that, at least among MAGs’ clients, cooperatives are
excellent borrowers. From a normative view point, it suggests that targeting
teams with high degree of complementarity and coordination among tasks is a
good lending strategy when no collateral is put up and social capital is weak.
7 Appendix
Remark that the OT considered in the text describes a special form of per-
fect correlation among tasks, whereas under the ST the outcomes of tasks are
stochastically independent. One may therefore think that perfect correlation
is a suﬃcient condition for peer selection to occur. In this Appendix we show
that this is not the case.
Consider a technology for which team output amounts to
q(nH,nL)nA, (A1)
when the team consists of nH good borrowers and nL bad ones. Let the prob-
ability of success 0 < q(nH,nL) ≤ 1 be increasing in nH and decreasing in
nL, q(n,0) = 1 and n = nH + nL. Note that this technology describes perfect
19correlation among tasks. The OT is a special case of this technology, where
q(nH,nL) = pnL.
Consider a contract {nR◦}, where nR◦ is the repayment that the team owes
to the microlender only in the case of success. If this contract is accepted, the
diﬀerence between good borrower’s expected proﬁt when the team counts all
good mates and the corresponding value when she teams up with all bad mates
is, under the hypothesis that each borrower is entitled to an amount 1/n of
team output,
[1 − q(1,n − 1)](A − R◦). (A2)
On the contrary, gain of a bad borrower from having all good partners instead
all bad ones is
[q(n − 1,1) − q(0,n)](A − R◦). (A3)
From the analysis in the text we know that peer selection occurs only if
(A2) > (A3), i.e.
1 − q(1,n − 1) > q(n − 1,1) − q(0,n). (A4)
This condition is satisﬁed with OT, but not, for example, when the probability
of success is equal to the mean probability, i.e. q(nH,nL) = (nH + pnL)/n.
In this case it is easy to check that both sides of inequality (A4) are equal to
(n − 1)[(1 − p)/n].
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